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Résumé / Abstract 
 
 
Cette étude s’intéresse à des aspects méthodologiques associés à l’utilisation d’expériences avec choix 
discrets pour évaluer des biens publics. Nous avons développé un modèle explicite de jeux théoriques 
pour des décisions individuelles à des séries de choix, avec conditions générales sous lesquelles un 
questionnaire  avec  des  choix  binaires  répétés  incite  la  révélation  des  valeurs.  Ce  développement 
théorique est suivi d’expériences terrains avec traitements qui couvrent le spectre des incitatifs de la 
révélation des valeurs, passant de la décision avec mise en place réelle du projet et paiements réels de 
la  part  des  participants,  à  celle  sans  aucune  conséquence  financière  directe  et  avec  projets 
hypothétiques. Les résultats indiquent qu’il est possible d’obtenir une révélation des valeurs réelles en 
situation  hypothétique,  si  les  participants  pensent  que  leurs  décisions  ont  un  potentiel  d’impact 
significatif sur une éventuelle politique.  
 
Mots clés : expériences avec choix discrets; expérience terrain; préférences 
révélées; conséquences, biais hypothétique 
 
 
This paper explores methodological issues surrounding the use of discrete choice experiments to elicit 
values for public goods. We develop an explicit game-theoretic model of individual decisions to a 
series of choice sets, providing general conditions under which surveys with repeated binary choices 
are incentive compatible. We complement the theory with a framed field experiment, with treatments 
that span the spectrum from incentive compatible, financially binding decisions to decisions with no 
direct financial consequences. The results suggest truthful preference revelation is possible in surveys, 
provided that respondents view their decisions as having more than a weak chance of influencing 
policy. 
 
Keywords: discrete choice experiment, framed field experiment, mechanism design 
theory, stated preferences, consequentiality 
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1. Introduction 
Survey-based value elicitation methods have been a mainstay in various strands of 
research, including the non-market valuation of public goods, the study of transportation mode 
choice, estimating the value of a statistical life, and consumer product marketing. Most 
applications are for policy evaluation, and meeting Presidential Executive Orders for the last 
three decades has required the use of survey valuation methods in the context of benefit-cost 
analyses. Despite the widespread use of these methods, the influence of economic incentives on 
survey responses remains insufficiently understood.   
It is widely acknowledged that an essential component of stated preference surveys is 
conveying to participants that their responses have purpose. In practice, responses are commonly 
treated as reflecting truthful preferences or viewed as answers to purely hypothetical questions. 
Those with the former view may do so regardless of how values are elicited. Those with the latter 
view may dismiss the methodology entirely or advocate the use of “cheap talk” and related 
entreaty methods to convince respondents to behave as if incentives exist. Rather than adopt a 
particular perspective, we develop a game theoretic framework to analyze the incentive 
properties of the discrete choice experiment (DCE) approach to valuation, and we conduct a field 
experiment where the empirical evidence speaks in both favorable and unfavorable terms on the 
ability of DCE surveys to measure demand.
1  
Origins of DCEs lie in Lancaster’s (1966) theory of value and McFadden’s (1974) 
random utility theory. Closely related conjoint analysis applications in marketing and 
                                                 
 
1 DCEs are also commonly referred to as “choice modeling”, “conjoint-based choice 
experiments” or simply “choice experiments”. 3 
 
transportation date back to at least the 1970s (e.g. Green and Rao, 1971; Norman and Louivere, 
1974; Beggs, Cardell and Hausman, 1981), with DCEs gaining prominence in the 1980s (e.g. 
Louivere and Hensher, 1982) and applications in health economics and environmental economics 
beginning in the 1990s (e.g. Carson, Hanemann and Steinberg, 1990; Ryan and Hughes, 1997). 
Recent studies have used DCEs to compare the risk and time preferences of smokers and non-
smokers (Ida and Goto, 2009), estimate preferences for electricity reliability (Blass, Lach and 
Manski, 2010), and elicit discount rates for water quality policies (Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 
2008).  
In a DCE, respondents are presented with a series of choice sets. Each set is made up of 
two or more comparable goods defined by their respective levels of common attributes, and 
respondents are asked to indicate the good they prefer. DCEs are often thought to be superior to 
alternative elicitation approaches, such as one-shot dichotomous choice, because of perceived 
gains in statistical efficiency; the ability to estimate the value of attributes at the margin, 
providing a richer depiction of preferences and facilitating benefits transfer studies; a reduction 
in some of the biases (e.g. “yea-saying”)  through decreased focus on either providing or not 
providing a particular good; and the possibility of testing for internal consistency (Alpízar, 
Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; Hanley, Mourato and Wright, 2001; Hanley, Wright and 
Adamowicz, 1998; Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003).   
Our study builds upon the theoretical insights of Carson and Groves (2007), and a 
handful of recent field and laboratory tests of criterion validity that compare a consequential 
stated preference measure and a revealed-preference criterion based on an incentive compatible 
mechanism. This literature represents a departure from the broader criterion validity research 
where purely hypothetical and inconsequential choices are the experimental counterpart to a 4 
 
stated preference survey. The two streams of literature suggest starkly different conclusions 
regarding the ability of stated preference surveys to truthfully reveal demand. The stylized fact 
from the broad literature is that there exists a positive and economically meaningful 
“hypothetical bias”, whereby people tend to overstate their values in hypothetical settings (List 
and Gallett, 2001; Little and Berrens, 2004; Murphy, Stevens and Weatherhead, 2005). On the 
other hand, when the focus is put on consequentiality of the survey, the evidence supports the 
view that one-shot dichotomous choice stated preference methods possess criterion validity 
(Carson et al., 2004; Johnston, 2006; Landry and List, 2007; Vossler and Evans, 2009; Vossler 
and Kerkvliet, 2003). Furthermore some studies have identified behavior in consequential (but 
non-incentive compatible elicitation settings) that is consistent with mechanism design theory 
predictions (Bateman et al., 2008; Carson et al., 2004; Polomé, 2003).  
In this study, we extend the existing theoretical and empirical literatures related to stated 
preference surveys in general and DCEs in particular. We develop an explicit game theoretic 
model of individual choice when participants are aware that they face multiple choices but where 
the mechanism by which individual decisions translate into the implementation of a public good 
can be explicit or unknown. The theory provides general conditions under which binary DCEs 
are incentive compatible. We show that for DCEs, incentive compatibility holds for a class of 
mechanisms that aggregate information in a way that maintains independence between choice 
sets and that meet specific monotonicity requirements (related to consequentiality). 
Unfortunately, in field surveys it is not possible to control the elicitation in a way that insures 
incentive compatibility, and we turn to empirics to gain insights on the ability of valuation 
surveys to reveal demand.  
 5 
 
In the empirical portion of the research, we conduct a framed field experiment that makes 
use of an opportunity to elicit values from local citizens for tree row plantations in agricultural 
areas of the province of Quebec (Canada). The field experiment represents the first criterion 
validity study involving a public good that compares values from an incentive compatible 
mechanism with that from an analogous advisory DCE survey. The baseline treatment involves 
an incentive compatible, financially binding DCE with a provision rule that makes clear that 
choice sets are independent. The next treatment involves a theoretically equivalent mechanism, 
but the provision rule does not make it absolutely clear that the independence condition holds. 
The third treatment involves a binding elicitation, but with no explicit provision rule. The last 
treatment is an advisory DCE that captures incentives in the field survey setting. In particular, 
there are no direct financial consequences of decisions and participants are informed that 
responses will be shared with policy makers but no information is given on how they will be 
used. Thus, overall, the experiment represents a continuum from which to explore the incentive 
properties of DCEs.  
We find that all three binding DCE treatments lead to statistically equivalent willingness 
to pay functions. The advisory DCE elicitation is not equivocal unless the sample is restricted to 
respondents who perceived that their choices had more than a “weak” chance of influencing 
policy. The empirical analysis suggests that truthful preference revelation is perhaps more likely 
than theory alone would suggest. However, only the subset of respondents who perceive their 
answers as consequential make choices similar to those in binding treatments. Hence, convincing 
respondents to stated preference surveys that their answers are consequential is critical to 
ensuring valid results.      
 6 
 
2.  Theoretical framework 
In this section we develop a theoretical framework for binary DCEs. In particular, we 
focus on a case where at most one policy/good can be provided, each choice set includes a status 
quo option, and the series of choice questions are disclosed in advance to respondents. This set-
up, while it does not encompass all forms of DCEs used in practice, fits many applications in 
environmental and health policy as well as recent field experiments in the marketing literature.
2 
We begin with the analysis of a tractable situation where there are direct financial consequences 
to the respondent and the provision rule is known. Once the fundamentals of this binding case 
have been established, the theory is extended to capture nuances of the stated preference, field 
survey setting. Our objective is to elaborate sufficient conditions to ensure that DCEs are 
incentive compatible. While these conditions are constructed around the theoretical arguments of 
Carson and Groves (2007), it is, to our knowledge, the first time that an explicit game theoretic 
model of individual choice in DCE’s has been put forth.  
 
2.1. Binding DCEs with full information about the policy function 
Consider a choice experiment with M participants each facing K choice sets where 
respondents are asked to indicate whether they prefer an alternative composed of a combination 
of attributes, or the status quo (no project being implemented). We refer to respondent’s choices 
as “votes”, a yes vote favoring the alternative in the choice set and a no vote favoring the status 
quo. Respondent i’s choices are represented by a vector Vi of length K, where each element 
                                                 
 
2 In particular, we refer to Lusk and Schroeder (2006), and others who have recently used choice 
experiments with direct financial consequences to analyze consumer preferences. 7 
 
indicates a yes or no vote for one of the K choice sets. Denote the “policy function” as a vector-
valued function  → = 1 2 :( ) ( , ,..., ) K F P P P 1 2 M V ,V ,...,V P that maps the votes of all M respondents into 
a vector P of the probabilities that each of the K alternatives will be implemented. By 
















= −∑ is the probability that the 
status quo is maintained.  
This policy function describes precisely how one’s vote affects the likelihood that each 
option will be implemented.
3 The probability-based policy function is important in two ways. 
First, it acknowledges that there is uncertainty surrounding how one’s responses translate into the 
implementation of an alternative or of the status quo. Second, it makes it explicit that one’s 
choices interact with the choices of other respondents. From our perspective, these are two 
critical aspects of choice experiments that have often been overlooked.  
For a representative respondent, we denote the utility of the status quo by  0 U , and the 
utility of alternative kby  = − ( ; ) k k k U u Y c A . Y is the individual’s income, ck is the individual cost 
of the alternative and Ak is the vector of non-monetary attribute levels for choice k.
4 It will be 
convenient to define U as the column transposition of the vector of utilities  1 2 ( , ,..., ) K U U U  to 
                                                 
 
3 For a binding DCE, the function F (·) is simply the mechanism used to select from the real 
project options presented in the DCE and the status quo. Later on, we consider uncertainty about 
the nature of F (·) both for binding DCEs as well as advisory DCEs. 
4 While  0 U and  K U are meant to represent the utility of a single individual, the presentation does 
not require that we maintain indices for different respondents.   
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represent the utility levels that an individual would get from the implementation of each of the K 
possible alternatives. 
The agent’s expected utility from participating in the DCE is therefore given by  
− − = ⋅ + 0 0 ( , ) ( , ) m m EU F PU V V V V U                                                                                    [1]   
where V-m represents the votes of all other participants. 
For this model of choice to be appropriate, it is essential that agents meet the basic 
rationality requirements of expected utility. In particular, agents must be able to assign a utility 
level to each of the choice alternatives and to the status quo. This is not sufficient for DCE’s to 
be incentive compatible, however. Carson and Groves (2007) correctly state that survey 
instruments cannot be incentive compatible if they are not perceived to be consequential. In their 
words, consequentiality requires that 1) “agents answering a survey question must view their 
response as potentially influencing the agency’s action”; and 2) “the agent needs to care about 
what the outcomes of those actions might be” (p.183).    
 
2.1.1. Consequentiality 
In our context, the consequentiality of any vote requires that for each respondent, 
changing any single vote from a “no” to a “yes” affects the probability of implementation of at 
least one of the K alternatives in the DCE:
5  
0 j k P V ∆ ∆ ≠ for at least one alternative j, for all k at least some of the time.            [2] 
                                                 
 
5 Without loss of generality, we adopt the notational convention that ∆ j V represents a change of 
vote from “no” to “yes” on option j by a respondent. The negative, −∆ j V will represent a change 
from “yes” to “no”. 9 
 
In other words, there has to be some probability that a participant’s votes will influence the 
outcome. This does not mean that every single vote must always have a direct marginal effect on 
the selection process. It could be, for instance, that F (·) relies on some form of majority rule in 
which a given participant’s choice may only be pivotal conditional on some combination of 
others’ votes. It is necessary, however, that each vote could be pivotal in some circumstances so 
that in expectation, each vote has the potential affect the outcome. Without [2], some or all of the 
votes have no influence (in expectation or in actuality) on the outcome, in which case, economic 
theory provides no guidance.  
 
2.1.2. Independence between choice sets  
With this framework in place, establishing the conditions for incentive compatibility 
requires a formal definition of the concept of independence between choice sets. We say that a 
policy function F (·) maintains independence between choice sets if  0 j k P V ∆ ∆ = ∀ ≠ j k. This 
condition simply means that if a participant were to change his vote on project k, the change can 
never have any impact on the probability that another outcome j will be implemented (where j 
excludes the status quo).  
When this condition is combined with the consequentiality condition [2], the DCE can 
only maintain independence and simultaneously be consequential if ∆ ∆ ≠ 0 k k P V in some 
circumstances, for all k.  
Proposition 1.  Incentive Compatibility.  
If the policy function F (·) maintains independence between choice sets in a DCE, the DCE is 
incentive compatible in expected utility only if the probability of implementing a project kis 10 
 
monotonically increasing in the number of yes votes it receives: ∆ ∆ ≥ ∀ 0 k k P V k , with strict 
monotonicity ∆ ∆ > 0 k k P V holding in some circumstances for all k.  
 
Proof: Consider the votes of an individual and, without loss of generality, order the different 
options (including the status quo) according to the level of utility it confers to this individual. 
The respondent’s complete preference ordering will therefore take the form:
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ 1 2 0 ... ... K U U U U  and the column vector of utilities will be ordered accordingly (except 
for the absence of  0 U ). Further define the demand revealing vector of votes V=T, in which option 
j receives a yes vote if and only if  0 j U U ≥ (all others receive a no vote).  
The expected utility for a respondent, given his truth revealing vector and arbitrary votes by all 
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The rest of the proof proceeds by establishing that T is a dominant strategy. Keeping  m − V
constant, consider any arbitrary variation Vaway from T. The resulting change in expected utility 
is then given by  
[ ]
− −
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If F (·) maintains independence between choice sets, the effect of changing the vote on option j is 
strictly limited to modifying Pj and P0. Thus, equation [4] reduces to  11 
 
( )( )
− − − −
− −
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V V T V
.      [5] 
If the initial vote in T was a yes,  − ≥ 0 0 j U U and − − − ≤ ( , ) ( , ) 0 j m j m P P V V T V  by virtue of the 
monotonicity assumption  ∆ ∆ ≥ ( 0) j j P V . It follows that the change in expected utility from 
changing any yes vote to a no vote cannot increase the participant’s expected utility. By contrast, 
if the initial vote in T was a no, i.e. 0 j U U ≤ , the first term in equation [5] becomes positive, while 
the second is non-positive. Once again, deviating from true preferences cannot increase the 
participant’s expected utility.  
As long as the function F (·) maintains independence between choice sets, the impact on 
expected utility of changing several votes from T to V can always be reduced to the sum of the 
individual changes, just as demonstrated above. The impact of each individual change is always 
non-positive (no matter what the strategies adopted by other participants are). We can therefore 
conclude that truthful revelation is a dominant strategy. Truthful revelation is only weakly 
dominant if the mechanism does not maintain strict monotonicity  ∆ ∆ > ( 0) k k P V everywhere or if 
= 0 j U U for one or more choice j. Absent these two sources of invariance, the demand revealing 
strategy T is strictly dominant. Finally, if the mechanism maintains strict monotonicity and if the 
strict inequality in utilities holds for all players, the demand revealing strategy T by all 
participants constitutes a unique Nash Equilibrium of the choice experiment game. 
The  independence  assumption  is  critical  to  the  result.  If 0 j k P V ∆ ∆ ≠ ,  the  costs  and 
benefits of deviating from T for project j are no longer confined to changes in  j P  and  0 P . This 
gives rise to the possibility of trading expected benefits and costs across two or more projects 
and would result in optimal individual choices that are inconsistent with incentive compatibility.  12 
 
2.2. Binding DCEs with incomplete information about the policy function 
In most policy-related DCEs, respondents are not given precise information about how 
their choices translate into policy or government action. It is therefore useful to consider how 
respondent uncertainty about the nature of the policy function F (·) might affect their incentives. 
One way of modeling this uncertainty is to postulate that respondents form beliefs about a range 
of possible policy functions and the probability that each will be implemented. In this context, 
the DCE can still be incentive compatible if  
i) the different policy functions considered by a respondent are mutually exclusive (only 
one policy function and one project can be implemented);  
ii) each possible policy function maintains independence between the choice sets;  
iii)  all  policy  functions  have  ∆ ∆ ≥ ∀ 0 k k P V k and  at  least  one  function  meets  all  the 
monotonicity conditions required for consequentiality (in particular, that ∆ ∆ > 0 k k P V
some of the time for all choice sets); and  
iv) at least one of the policy functions must be associated with a positive belief that it can 
be implemented.   
These sufficient conditions are strong enough that, even when the respondent considers 
the decisions of other participants, there is no strategic incentive to deviate from preference 
revelation  for  anyone  who  believes  that  these  conditions  hold.  A  participant  could  even 
conjecture that others have beliefs that are not consistent with the sufficient conditions and it 
would still be optimal for this participant to vote according to his preferences. In short, with 
beliefs that respect all conditions above, there is no possible strategic gain from misrepresenting 
one’s preferences. Of course, those holding beliefs that violate the conditions might not see it as 
optimal to reveal their preferences.  13 
 
As in the discussion of Carson and Groves (2007), the requirements simply ensure that 
participants will find it in their best interest to vote truthfully on all choice sets as long as they 
believe that a yes vote increases the likelihood of the option being implemented (with no chance 
of decreasing it). 
 
2.3. Advisory DCEs 
In the stated preference setting, participants are made aware that they are providing 
information on their preferences and are typically told that the information will be used by 
authorities to formulate policies. Such statements have the purpose of giving respondents a sense 
that their answers have consequences, presumably in the hope that it provides incentives for 
them to make careful choices that accurately reflects their preferences. 
As the scope of a DCE broadens from a setting with direct financial consequences and an 
unspecified policy rule to an advisory survey, even more details of the DCE are left to the 
interpretation of respondents. Respondents must form their own beliefs about a) how the 
experiment’s choice sets relate to the range of policies that may actually be devised; b) what their 
true cost to them might be; c) how the information provided affects the policy design; and d) 
how choices modify the likelihood that any policy will be implemented.   
Having worked through the binding DCE scenarios above, establishing the requirements 
for incentive compatibility in an advisory survey is relatively straightforward. The principal 
difference is that rather than working with a factual policy function, the analysis must proceed in 
the realm of respondent’s beliefs about possible policies and how their votes influence the policy 
maker’s decisions. If respondents form beliefs about how their choices influence a range of 
potential outcomes, they are once again required to form beliefs about the various policy 14 
 
functions that might be implemented. One important departure from a binding DCE with an 
unspecified rule, is that in an advisory survey, the range of possible policy outcomes that a 
participant might conjecture is as broad one’s imagination, much broader than the simple 
implementation of one of the options included in the choice sets.   
Under these circumstances, a DCE survey for general policy purposes will be incentive 
compatible if, in addition to maintaining the conditions laid out for a binding setting with 
incomplete information about the policy rule, the mapping from choice sets to the possible policy 
outcomes considered by a respondent must also maintain independence. As before, the basic 
thrust of the independence condition is that a respondent cannot believe that voting yes for a 
particular alternative changes the likelihood of implementation of other alternatives. Without 
independence, a vote on a single alternative expresses preferences about more than one 
alternative (or for certain combinations of attributes), potentially giving rise to non-truthful 
voting. Any deviation from one-to-one mapping between the choice sets presented in the 
experiment and the beliefs of a respondent about possible policy outcomes almost certainly 
violates the independence condition and incentive compatibility can no longer be guaranteed.   
      
2.4. Conditions for incentive compatibility in the field experiment 
We now discuss briefly conditions for incentive compatibility as they directly relate to 
the field experiment component of this study. In all of our experimental treatments, respondents 
were told that their choices would inform the development of policies by government agencies. 
In one treatment, there are no direct financial consequences and the conditions for incentive 
compatibility are those, discussed above, for an advisory DCE. In the remaining three treatments, 
participants’ choices had direct financial consequences and so two sources of incentives (direct 15 
 
and indirect) must be considered jointly. When choices have direct financial consequences as 
well as broader policy implications, a respondent’s vote must maximize  
( ) − − −
= =
= − − + ∑∑ 0,0 0
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ; ,
K B
m k m b m k b k b
k b
EU P P u Y c c A A P U V V V V V V       [6] 
Where the subscripts, b, denotes (beliefs about) the broad policies that might be implemented, 
their attributes ( b A ), cost ( b c ), and probability of implementation ( b P ) as a function of the votes 
of all respondents.  0,0 P is the probability that the status quo remains.  
For these treatments to be incentive compatible, one of following three conditions must 
hold in addition to the independence and monotonicity conditions.  
I.  Beliefs about the policy outcomes  b A  ,  b c and the mechanism generating  b P are identical 
to the actual choice sets (and probabilities of implementation) for real project 
implementation;   
II.  The policy component is inconsequential (i.e. changing votes does not alter any  b P ) 
III. The real project component is inconsequential (i.e. changing votes does not alter any  k P ) 
In the first instance, any disparity between the policy options and the actual choice sets 
will almost certainly lead (if both are consequential) to a failure of the independence condition. 
To see this, note that changing a single vote on choice j affects the probability of true 
implementation  j P  (and  0,0 P ). Thus, all states of the world in which the joint probabilities 
includes  j P  will be affected. Changing a vote on project j will have a marginal effect on the 
probability of implementing several public policies with differing attribute levels. It follows 
directly that independence cannot be maintained unless the choice sets presented to respondents 16 
 
maps directly and identically onto both the real project implementation and the policy 
consequences.  
The last two conditions simply reduce the situation to, respectively, the advisory and 
binding DCE cases we previously analyzed, in which either only the direct implementation or the 
policy implications affect the respondent’s decision, but not both. For an empirical survey with 
obvious measurement errors, it might be sufficient for “good measurements” that the direct 
implementation has a much greater marginal impact on the respondent’s utility function.      
 
3.  Study design 
3.1. Description of Projects and Choice Sets 
The field experiment component of this research is designed to provide insights on the 
issues of consequentiality and demand revelation in advisory DCEs. At its core is a survey 
instrument that elicits values for riparian and windbreak tree planting projects on agricultural 
land in the province of Quebec, Canada. This survey is part of a broader research effort to 
identify policies that enhance biodiversity, landscape amenities and provide soil erosion control 
in the region.  
Key project attributes and their relevant levels were identified through multiple pretests 
involving 140 individuals.  Three attributes describe the tree planting projects: (1) Location, 
whether riparian (e.g. along a stream) or a as windbreak alongside a road); (2) Length, that is, the 
number of meters of streamside or roadside covered by the plantation; and (3) Width, the number 
of rows of trees to be planted.  
Table 1 presents the project attributes and their levels as well as the range of prices 
explored. The Location and Width attributes have 2 levels, the Length attribute has 3 levels, and 17 
 
the Cost or price attribute has 4 levels. The full factorial is thus 2x2x3x4 or 48. To reduce the 
total number of options, we generated 24 unique options using the SAS macro %mktex to enable 
identification of all main effects and two-way interactions (excluding Cost from the interactions) 
while maximizing D-efficiency. D-efficiency is 99%, and the design has perfect balance with 
respect to the non-price attributes, i.e. each of the possible 2x2x3 “projects” appear twice. By 
pairing each option with the status quo, there are 24 unique choice sets, and to reduce cognitive 
burden, these were separated into two blocks of 12 wherein each block included each unique 
project only once. Each participant received one block of 12 choice sets. Thus, to be clear, each 
participant voted on each project once, and only the project prices differed across participants. 
To remain consistent with field survey settings, the fact that different participants saw different 
prices was not common knowledge. The choice sets were presented as binary referenda where a 
“yes” vote is a choice for the tree planting project and a “no” vote is a choice for no tree planting 
project (i.e. the status quo).  
  
3.2. Experiment treatments 
The study is divided into four experimental treatments. In three of them, participants have 
the direct opportunity to fund an actual tree planting project through their choices with their own 
money. Two of these three treatments are designed to be theoretically incentive compatible if 
any  influence  of  choices  on  broader  policy  issues  are  ignored.  In  the  fourth  treatment, 
participants cannot directly finance tree projects and no project can be implemented as a direct 
result of their choices. The ordering of the treatments mirrors the development of the theory, and 
accordingly, reflects expectations of the likelihood the elicitation is demand revealing.  
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3.2.1. Binding DCE, Independent Lottery Provision Rule (B-IL) 
In this treatment, respondents’ votes probabilistically lead to the implementation of one 
of the 12 projects, or the status quo. Participants are instructed that one of the 12 choice sets will 
be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment, each with equal probability. This random 
selection procedure was chosen to make clear to participants that choice sets are independent. 
For the selected choice set, the proportion of yes votes among all participants is computed. A 
second draw is then performed to choose between the status quo and the implementation of the 
project. In this second draw, the real project is implemented with a probability equal to the 
proportion of yes votes it received. This probabilistic implementation rule is superior to a 
common majority-vote rule in that it provides incentives to all participants by eliminating the 
possibility that one might perceive his vote to be non-pivotal, i.e. the provision rule imposes 
strict monotonicity. 
In execution, one of the 12 choice sets is selected by rolling a 12-sided die. Two 10-sided 
dice are used to obtain a number between 0 and 99, this number is then the “acceptance level”. If 
the percentage of yes vote equals or exceeds the acceptance level, the project is accepted and 
each participant must pay his individual cost amount. The selected project, as described, will 
then be undertaken. Otherwise, no money is collected and no tree project is carried out. 
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where KM is the total number of votes cast. If beliefs about possible government policies are 
consistent with the choice sets (Condition I) or if the broader government policy implications are 
inconsequential (Condition II - or considered much less important than the real and immediately 19 
 
costly project implementations), then  0 k k P V k ∆ ∆ > ∀ . By Proposition 1, this mechanism is 
incentive compatible and truthful revelation of demand a dominant strategy.  
 
3.2.2. Binding DCE, Aggregate Lottery Provision Rule (B-AL) 
In the second treatment, each vote for a particular option (whether a project or the status 
quo) directly maps into the probability the option is implemented. This is made operational by 
assigning each of the 12 projects, and the status quo, a separate color. Each participant’s yes vote 
adds one poker chip of the corresponding color to a bag. A no vote, favoring the status quo, adds 
a black colored chip. After all votes are cast, the bag is filled with  1 2 ( , ,..., ) K N N N of the K different 









KM N black chips (for a total of KM chips).  The option to be 
implemented is determined by a single draw from the bag. If a colored chip is drawn, the 
corresponding project is implemented. If a black chip is drawn, the status quo prevails.  
    With  this  implementation  procedure,  it  follows  that  the  probability  that  project  k  is 
implemented is once again given by  k N KM , and the policy function is identical to that of the B-
IL treatment. It is similarly incentive compatible with truthful demand revelation as a strictly 
dominant  strategy  if  we  abstract  from  broader  policy  implications,  i.e.  if  condition  (I)  or 
condition  (II)  hold.  However,  as  votes  for  all  choice  sets  are  considered  in  the  aggregation 






3.2.3. Binding DCE, Undisclosed Provision Rule (B-U) 
In the third treatment, participants are informed that their choices will be used to 
determine which option will be implemented, i.e. the elicitation is consequential and there are 
direct financial consequences. However, no description of the provision rule was provided to 
participants.  As such, participants were free to form beliefs about how an option might be 
chosen and how their votes could influence this choice. Without additional precision on the 
provision rule, there can be no guarantee that independence is maintained or that the mechanism 
is incentive compatible even when the direct financial component is considered in isolation. 
In practice, one of the 12 choice sets was selected at random using a 12-sided die, and a 
simple majority-vote rule decided whether the particular project would be carried out not. 
 
3.2.4. Advisory DCE (A) 
The last treatment is a non-binding, stated preference DCE wherein participants voted on 
12 projects without direct financial consequences. As in other treatments, participants were told 
that the results of the study would be provided to a government agency. To the extent that they 
believe that their choices can influence actual policy decisions, this too would be a consequential 
elicitation. Even so, however, as discussed in the theory section, it is probable that at least some 
participants might form beliefs (about the way in which the information will be used) that do not 
maintain the desirable assumption of independence between choice sets.  
 
3.3. Experiment Protocol and Survey Description 
    Aside from the particular provision rule, and associated financial incentives, the 
experimental protocol was identical across all treatments. Participants were given a show-up 21 
 
payment of C$100 (100 Canadian Dollars) in the real payment treatments and C$50 in the 
advisory DCE.
6 The show-up payments differed in this fashion in attempt to, based on our pilot 
data, equate expected earnings across treatments. Experiment instructions were presented using a 
PowerPoint presentation (available upon request) by the same moderator. The presentation slides 
included a brief introduction of the study, descriptions and computer-edited before and after 
photographs illustrating the tree projects and attribute levels that that participants would vote on, 
and, in the case of the binding DCEs, two examples illustrating the implementation mechanism. 
Participants also had a paper copy of the photographs and a description of the benefits of riparian 
and windbreaker tree plantings.  
Participants were informed that their surveys would be shared with policy makers, but 
that anonymity would be maintained. For a particular treatment, six versions of the survey were 
randomly assigned to participants to be completed using a pencil. The versions differ by the 
order of the choice sets to control for possible order effects, and by the different price vectors.  
Aside from the discussion of provision rules, the process closely parallels a field survey. In the 
first section of the survey, participants are asked questions that elicit participants’ attitudes on 
environmental issues. The second section contains the DCE. The third section asked typical 
demographic questions, in addition to questions intended to gauge strategic voting and 
consequentiality. 
                                                 
 
6 The payment was given in cash upon arrival. Participants were told orally and in writing that 
this money was theirs to keep and informed that they are free to leave at any moment and still 
retain the show-up payment. Two participants choose to leave with the show-up fee without 
completing the study. 22 
 
3.4 Participants 
Participants were volunteer adults recruited through a mailing list of Laval University 
employees and friends of Laval, as well as through the mailing list of the Institut des 
Nutraceutiques et des Aliments Fonctionnels (INAF).
7 These lists included roughly 5000 people 
who have expressed an interest in receiving news from Laval University or INAF. Participants 
needed to be at least 18 years old and could only participate once. Eight sessions, two for each 
treatment, took place between March and June 2009 in the INAF building located in Quebec 
City. Volunteers were randomly assigned into treatment, which makes possible the identification 
of treatment effects. 
Two hundred and twenty participants completed the experiment, with a roughly equal 
number of participants in the four treatments: 58, 55, 52, and 55 respectively. Three projects 
were implemented as the result of votes in the six binding DCE sessions: a 1 km by 3 rows 
windbreaker, a 1 km by 1 row windbreaker, and a riparian band of 1km by 3 rows.    
Table 2 presents some basic demographic information on our participants. We note that 
the demographics are similar across treatments (detailed information available upon request). 
Overall, the average participant has a higher household income and is better educated than the 
general population of Quebec. The age distribution (and average age), employment rate, and 
percentage of males are similar. As the primary goal of the study is to provide insight on 
                                                 
 
7 For the advisory DCE treatment people were recruited by announcing a C$50 participation 
payment. For the other treatments, participants were recruited by announcing an expected gain of 
C$50 with the mention that the amount might be greater or lower, depending of the outcome of 
the session. 23 
 
important methodological issues, we make no claims regarding the suitability of our results as 
population estimates.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Analysis of Willingness to Pay 
We begin our analysis with the estimation of a WTP regression based on the maximum 
likelihood estimator of Cameron and James (1987). In particular, we treat willingness to pay as a 
censored dependent variable for which we obtain the signal  , , t ik t ik WTP c ≥  if, in treatment t, 
participant i votes “yes” to cost ct,ik associated with a project k, or the signal  , , t ik t ik WTP c < if 
participant i votes “no”. Let WTPt,ik be a linear function of a column vector of covariates, xt,ik, 
such that  , , , t ik t ik t t ik WTP ' ε = + β β β β x , where t β β β β  is a column vector of unknown parameters and  , t ik ε is a 
normally distributed mean-zero error term with treatment-specific standard deviation σt.   
Let yt,ik = 1 denote a “yes” vote and yt,ik = 0 indicate a “no” vote. Further, denote  , t ik I as an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if participant i faces treatment t and equals 0 otherwise. Then, the 
log-likelihood function is  
( )
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Assuming the error term has a normal distribution here is analogous to assuming a normal 
distribution for WTP.  24 
 
Included as covariates are project attributes, as well as control variables that correspond 
with household size, income and attainment of a graduate degree.
8 To control for unmeasured 
factors specific to an individual we estimate cluster-robust standard errors. With our functional 
form and error distribution assumption, interpretation of estimated parameters is analogous to 
that of a standard linear regression model that treats WTP as a directly observed (i.e. uncensored) 
dependent variable. 
9  
  The first set of estimation results presented in Table 3 uses the full sample of 220 
participants. Estimation is by means of a user-defined maximum likelihood procedure 
programmed by the authors in Stata. The overall model results suggest that, in all treatments, the 
estimated marginal WTP for the Length, Width, and Location attributes are statistically 
significant (beyond the 1% level) and economically meaningful. For instance, ceteris paribus, 
the estimated WTP function for the B-IL treatment suggests that participants are willing to pay 
about C$0.04 for every one-meter increase in length (or C$4 for a 100m increase), C$12.48 for 
an additional row of trees and an additional C$9.75 if the tree planting is in a riparian area. This 
suggests a high total WTP for many of the tree projects offered to respondents. As further 
evidence of construct validity, those with higher income and education (the latter effect is only 
                                                 
 
8 In our initial specification we included all demographic variables defined in Table 2, as well as 
interactions between all project attributes. The more parsimonious specification we present is 
justified by statistical tests. No conclusion we reach is sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of 
these other covariates. 
9 We also explored the logistic, log-logistic, log-normal and Weibull distributions for the error 
term. Our statistical conclusions appear robust to the distributional assumption. 25 
 
significant at the 7% significance level) are willing to pay more for tree plantings, whereas 
participants with larger households (which likely reflects higher demands on household income) 
are willing to pay less.   
  The standard deviation of WTP is the lowest for the B-IL treatment, which is 
hypothesized to be the most transparent in terms of its incentives. Relative to the B-IL treatment, 
the scale for the other three treatments is statistically different, and in particular is about 50% 
higher in the B-U and A treatments, and about 70% higher in the B-AL treatment. This is 
evidence that the less transparent treatments are associated with significantly more behavioral 
noise.  
  Applying a standard Wald test to the “Full Sample” model, we tested for equality in the 
marginal WTP of program attributes across treatments as well as for equal overall WTP 
functions (in particular, equal marginal WTP for all attributes as well as an identical intercept). 
The results of these tests, details of which are presented in Table 4, can be succinctly 
summarized as follows: (i) the binding DCE treatments elicited statistically indistinguishable 
WTP functions; and (ii) the advisory DCE function is statistically different form that of any other 
treatment.  Examining the test results a bit closer, for each possible pairwise test involving two 
binding DCE treatments, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal marginal WTP for any 
attribute, even at the 10% level. Indeed, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that all three WTP 
functions are identical. In contrast, marginal WTP for Length and Width tends to be statistically 
higher for the advisory DCE. To put this into perspective, for a moderate-level project (Length = 
600; Rows=3; Location=0), estimated mean WTP from the B-IL function is C$45.73 whereas it 
is C$60.31 using the advisory DCE function (a 32% increase).   
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4.2. Survey evidence 
4.2.1. Strategic voting 
  In treatments B-IL and B-AL, Proposition 1 holds as a result of the particular (and 
disclosed) provision rule used. However, unless condition (I) or (II) is satisfied, the elicitation 
mechanisms are not incentive compatible. Further, as discussed in the theory section, very strong 
assumptions are needed for the incentive compatibility of treatment B-U as well as the advisory 
DCE. As (perceived) non-independence of a participant’s voting choices could give rise to 
strategic voting and subsequent non-incentive compatibility, we included a survey question to 
measure the effect of strategic considerations on voting. In particular, we asked participants – 
after they had voted but before the outcome (if any) was announced – whether they had 
considered how other participants might vote the choices of other people in the group when 
voting, and if so, to indicate how many of their own votes were affected by the consideration of 
others’ votes.  
  Responses to the survey question, by treatment, are presented in Table 5. The most 
striking is the advisory DCE where just one respondent provided an indication of strategic 
voting. There is some stated evidence of strategic voting in the B-IL and B-AL treatments, where 
roughly 10% indicated that strategic motivations affected two or more votes. The most support 
of strategic voting is for the B-U treatment, where 25% indicated strategic voting. However, the 
impact of strategic voting appears to be modest at best for this treatment, as less than 6% 
suggested that strategic considerations altered three or more votes and just one of these 
respondents indicated it had affected more than five votes. Using pair-wise Komolgorov-
Smirnov Tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal response distributions in all cases. 
As a robustness check, we re-estimated equation [7] while excluding any participant with stated 27 
 
evidence of strategic voting. All of our findings remain. The overall evidence suggests that while 
some strategic voting is present in the binding treatments, the resulting bias is negligible.  
 
4.2.2 Indirect consequences  
  Contrary to the binding DCE treatments, a necessary condition for incentive 
compatibility of the advisory DCE is that respondents perceive their votes to have some potential 
influence on public policy. The question we asked all respondents (after they had voted), roughly 
translated from French, is “To what extent do you believe that your votes will be taken into 
account by the authorities?” The six response categories, and the number of respondents that 
selected each are presented as Table 6. As indirect consequences in the advisory DCE are 
essential to incentive compatibility, we explored whether elicited preferences depend on this. In 
particular, we re-estimated the model defined by equation [7] with restricted samples. In our first 
pass, we excluded the six advisory DCE respondents who perceived their responses to have, at 
most, a very weak influence. This had little effect, which is not surprising given this excluded 
only 11% of the advisory DCE sample. Second, we excluded the 25 respondents who perceived 
their influence to be weak at best. We present the resultant “Restricted Sample” model in Table 
3.  
  Using Wald tests, with the restricted sample, we fail to reject equality between the 
advisory DCE WTP function and any of the three binding DCE functions: B-IL=A (χ
2=5.47, 
p=0.2421); B-AL=A (χ
2=4.89, p=0.2992); B-U=A (χ
2=7.20, p=0.1255). Further, as the decrease 
in sample size leads to a less powerful test, we estimated another model that restricted the real 
payment WTP to be equal (recall these restrictions were supported) and still likewise fail to 
reject equality between the (pooled) binding DCE function and the advisory DCE function 28 
 
(χ
2=6.10, p=0.1918). We note that each WTP function coefficient corresponding with the 
advisory DCE moves closer to those from the B-IL and B-AL treatments when using the 
restricted sample. This provides additional evidence that the equality of WTP functions is not 
purely a function of the reduction in sample size. To put this into perspective, for a moderate-
level project (Length = 600; Rows=3; Location=0 - roadside), estimated mean WTP from the B-
IL function in the “Restricted Sample” model is C$46.10 whereas it is C$54.50 using the 
advisory DCE function. This difference is not statistically significant (χ
2=1.82, p=0.177).   
  To provide (further) empirical evidence that condition (I) or (II) holds for the binding 
DCE treatments, we re-estimated equation [7] but allowed all the attribute-related coefficients as 
well as the intercepts to vary between those who perceived the indirect incentives to be strong 
and those who perceived otherwise. Based on the cutoff point described above, we fail to reject 
equality of equal WTP functions across subgroups for any of the binding DCE treatments: B-IL 
(χ
2=7.04, p=0.1339); B-AL (χ
2=6.87, p=0.1430); B-U (χ
2=2.22, p=0.6961). We can (marginally) 
reject that the WTP functions are equal across subgroups for the advisory DCE (χ
2=8.48, 
p=0.0754).   
 
5. Discussion 
From a mechanism design perspective, using a stated preference, advisory DCE to 
truthfully elicit preferences for public goods is a dubious task. Generally speaking, as derived in 
this paper, incentive compatibility requires respondents to believe that decisions are 
consequential and furthermore, that policy makers use the information in such a way that 
maintains choice set independence. In the field survey setting these beliefs cannot be directly 
observed or conclusively controlled for and it is quite simple to construct any number of belief 29 
 
systems that fail the test of incentive compatibility. The evidence from our field experiment, 
nevertheless, suggests that independence is rarely violated, and that consistent preference 
revelation is possible if we restrict the sample to those who perceived that their responses had 
more than a weak impact on policy. We note that when no restrictions on the sample are made, 
however, the magnitude of the bias is modest and is between 32-43% across the range of tree 
planting projects we investigate. 
Why not vote strategically in an advisory DCE? We have no definitive answer but it is at 
least plausible that the complication of the decision task strains the cognitive resources of 
participants; or perhaps, that the policy process is sufficiently opaque to respondents that their 
beliefs about the policy process remain closely tied the options presented to them in the survey 
material and choice experiment itself. If this were true, it would signal that stated preference 
methods can indeed be considered credible by respondents and produce quality data. There is a 
word of caution in broadly interpreting our evidence as it is possible that strategic voting occurs 
in other settings, such as when three or more options are included in a choice set or when 
preferences for private goods are elicited. Theoretical assumptions for incentive compatibility are 
much more substantive in such settings, and it is unclear to what extent theoretical shortcomings 
translate into empirical results. 
A main take home message from this study is that, even in an advisory survey where 
financial incentives are indirect and remote, incentives do indeed exist. However, at least if we 
take at face value the stated perceptions regarding the consequences of the advisory DCE, our 
findings suggest that respondents must perceive there to be higher than merely an epsilon chance 
that the elicitation has consequences. This finding contrasts the sharper empirical results in the 
existing literature (e.g. Herriges et al., 2010), but nevertheless highlights the importance of 30 
 
consequentiality and the potential value in including pertinent survey questions. The evidence 
lends support to the view that the notion of consequentiality is more important than the “real vs. 
hypothetical” type of comparison commonly used in determining the criterion validity of an 
advisory survey. 
In an attempt to identify factors correlated with consequentialism, we modeled the 
categorical choices to our consequentiality question using an ordered probit model. Including the 
variables described in Table 2 as well as treatment indicators as covariates, we uncovered very 
little. The only statistically significant factor was whether the participant gave money to charity 
in the past year, with those doing so selecting roughly one category lower (less consequential), 
on average. It is plausible that those giving to charity are more likely to question the ability of 
the government to undertake action. By all accounts, further exploration into respondent 
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Table 1.  Discrete Choice Experiment Attributes and Levels 
 
Attribute  Description  Levels  




Width  Number of rows in tree planting  1 
3 
Location  Location of tree planting  Riparian (along stream or river) 
Windbreak (along roadside) 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Name  Description  Sample Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Gender  % Male  45.00 (49.86) 
Age  Age, in years  40.30 (13.80) 
College Degree  % with college degree or higher  62.27 (48.58) 
Graduate Degree  % with graduate degree  35.45 (47.95) 
Employment  % currently employed  77.27 (42.00) 
Income   Household income, in C$ 1000s; the midpoint of the 
category chosen by the respondent is used  62.34 (40.58) 
Environmental   % members of an environmental organization  6.82 (25.26) 
Household Size  Number currently living in the household  2.57 (1.45) 
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Table 3.  Willingness to Pay Regressions 
  Full Sample
  Restricted Sample
1 
Binding DCE, Independent Lottery Provision Rule (B-IL) 
Length [meters]  0.039** (0.004)  0.039** (0.004) 
Width [rows of trees]  12.475** (1.399)  12.463** (1.395) 
Location [=1 if Riparian; =0 if Roadside]  9.745** (2.710)  9.718** (2.709) 
Intercept  -15.036** (6.095)  -14.610* (6.136) 
Scale (σ)  21.637** (2.191)  21.576** (2.182) 
Binding DCE, Aggregate Lottery Provision Rule (B-AL) 
Length [meters]  0.035** (0.007)  0.035** (0.007) 
Width [rows of trees]  11.355** (2.374)  11.357** (2.375) 
Location [=1 if Riparian; =0 if Roadside]  9.244** (3.448)  9.270** (3.453) 
Intercept  -3.674 (8.698)  -3.270 (8.716) 
Scale (σ)  37.099** (5.012)  37.192** (5.022) 
Binding DCE, Undisclosed Provision Rule (B-U) 
Length [meters]  0.039** (0.007)  0.039** (0.007) 
Width [rows of trees]  14.853** (1.819)  14.870** (1.825) 
Location [=1 if Riparian; =0 if Roadside]  17.584** (4.603)  17.588** (4.611) 
Intercept  -28.832** (9.935)  -28.408** (9.987) 
Scale (σ)  32.507** (4.293)  32.577** (4.295) 
Advisory DCE (A) 
Length [meters]  0.063** (0.006)  0.052** (0.007) 
Width [rows of trees]  17.625** (2.579)  16.121** (2.638) 
Location [=1 if Riparian; =0 if Roadside]  15.930** (4.178)  12.013** (3.851) 
Intercept  -30.333** (7.978)  -25.292** (8.290) 
Scale (σ)  33.099** (3.554)  29.432** (3.993) 
Control Variables: 
Household size   -3.498** (1.181)  -3.688** (1.185) 
Income  0.100* (0.043)  0.107* (0.043) 
Graduate Degree   5.922 (3.225)  4.911 (3.246) 
Log-likelihood  -1307.844  -1176.891 
N  2640  2340 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * and ** denote parameter is 
statistically different from zero at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
1 Sample 
excludes participants in the Advisory DCE treatment who perceived that survey only had “weak” 
chance of influencing public policy.       38 
 
Table 4.  Tests of Equal Willingness to Pay Across Treatments 
 
Hypothesis  χ χ χ χ
2  p-value 
Equal Marginal Willingness to Pay for Attribute “Length” 
B-IL = B-AL  0.22  0.6370 
B-IL = B-U  0.00  0.9968 
B-AL = B-U  0.15  0.6946 
B-IL = A  9.96  0.0016 
B-AL = A  8.99  0.0027 
B-U = A  6.28  0.0122 
Equal Marginal Willingness to Pay for Attribute “Width” 
B-IL = B-AL  0.16  0.6863 
B-IL = B-U  1.06  0.3030 
B-AL = B-U  1.36  0.2431 
B-IL = A  3.05  0.0806 
B-AL = A  3.21  0.0732 
B-U = A  0.77  0.3805 
Equal Marginal Willingness to Pay for Attribute “Location” 
B-IL = B-AL  0.01  0.9094 
B-IL = B-U  2.15  0.1427 
B-AL = B-U  2.10  0.1474 
B-IL = A  1.53  0.2161 
B-AL = A  1.53  0.2168 
B-U = A  0.07  0.7908 
Equal Willingness to Pay Functions 
B-IL = B-AL  2.38  0.6665 
B-IL = B-U  4.19  0.3806 
B-AL = B-U  6.80  0.1466 
B-IL = A  19.29  0.0007 
B-AL = A  12.39  0.0147 
B-U = A  20.36  0.0004 
B-IL = B-AL = B-U  7.82  0.4515 
B-IL = B-AL = B-U = A  30.72  0.0022 
Notes: Tests are based on “Full Sample” model, allowing for unequal variances. Key to 
Abbreviations:  B-IL = Binding DCE, Independent Lottery Provision Rule; B-AL = Binding 
DCE, Aggregate Lottery Provision Rule; B-U = Binding DCE, Undisclosed Provision Rule; A = 
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Undisclosed  Advisory DCE 
         
No impact  N = 51 (87.9%)  48 (87.3%)  39 (75.0%)  54 (98.2%) 
         
Affected 1 vote   2 (3.4%)  2 (3.6%)  5 (9.6%)  0 (0.0%) 
         
Affected 2 votes  4 (6.9%)  3 (5.5%)  5 (9.6%)  1 (1.8%) 
         
Affected 3 to 5 votes  1 (1.7%)  1 (1.8%)  2 (3.8%)  0 (0.0%) 
         
Affected >5 votes  0 (0.0%)  1 (1.8%)  1 (1.9%)  0 (0.0%) 
         
Note: * denotes hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level.  
 
   40 
 








Undisclosed  Advisory DCE 
         
Not at all    N = 4 (6.9%)  1 (1.8%)  1 (1.9%)  1 (1.8%) 
         
Very weak   2 (3.4%)  11 (20.0%)  7 (13.5%)  5 (8.6%) 
         
Weak  13 (22.4%)  20 (36.4%)  16 (30.8%)  19 (34.5%) 
         
Moderate  25 (43.1%)  17 (30.9%)  22 (42.3%)  25 (45.5%) 
         
Strong  11 (19.0%)  5 (8.6%)  4 (7.7%)  4 (7.3%) 
         
Very strong  3 (5.2%)  1 (1.8%)  2 (3.8%)  1 (1.8%) 
         
 
 